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Abstract
Every action, touch, utterance, and look, every listening, taste, smell, and feel is a living question;
but it is no ordinary propositional one-by-one question, rather it is a plenisentient sensing and probing
non-propositional enquiry about how our world is, in its present continuous sense, and in relation to how
we anticipate its becoming. I will take this assumption as my first premise and, by using the notion of
enkinaesthesia, I will explore the ways in which an agent’s affectively-saturated co-engagement with its
world establishes patterns of co-articulation of meaning within the anticipatory affective dynamics and the
experiential entanglement necessary for expedient action and adaptation. In advancing this thesis I will
reject the minimalist notions of embodiment by amplifying and extending the claims made by the most
radical of the embodied mind theories. Crucially, I will offer a new wave of embodiment theory which has
at its core the radical extension of sensorimotor affect into the life and being of other agents where their
experience is for us both direct and immediate. This I will present as an immanent intercorporeality.
Introduction
It can be taken as uncontentious that human beings act in the world as conscious, socially and culturally em-
bedded, experiencing agents, rich in their unique experiential histories, and rich in their greatly distributed,
complex array of felt affective relations and interrelations with other agents and things. In respect of their
greatly distributed, complex array of felt affective relations and interrelations with other agents and things,
human beings are no different from all other animals; it is with this affective field of activity that we will
be concerned. Within this field I will advance the grounds for an immanent intercorporeality with the being
of others, conceptualising this notion in terms of an extended, even distributed, notion of enkinaesthetic
embodiment. This notion goes beyond those conceived and proposed to date, so it is incumbent upon me to
indicate how it differs from the others, and also to demonstrate how it offers an improvement on them.
I will begin by questioning the privacy of experience; in doing so I will agree with Varela that there is
an identifiable difference between personal and private in our experience of others and their experience of
us. This will enable me to introduce the key concept of ‘enkinaesthesia’, by which I mean the community
and reciprocity of our affectively-laden dialogue1 with others, including other animals.2 Within such an
1By ‘dialogue’ I mean only the interactivity of agents and not textual, linguistic, or conversational activity, though interactivity
within the human species does usually include this.
2Objects can also affect us, for example, the presence or absence of a treasured possession affects us in very different ways.
Interobjectivity is a crucial aspect of our lived and living experience, but it is not characterised by a reciprocity of affect, and it is not
the concern of this essay.
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affectively-laden dialogue we experience the implicit, and, sometimes, explicit intentional co-agency of
the other, learning through experience to anticipate the intentional trajectory of their action, and establishing
prosodies of resonance and fragmentation – which we might think of as the felt cadences of living experience
– “regulated by emotions of affection and enjoyment, expressed and given meaningful form by rhythms of
modulated movement” [Malloch & Trevarthen 2009, p.2] and action. From here I will argue that in all
agential action3, and as part of their continually updating experiential horizon, all agents ask tacit, pre-
reflective, pre-conceptual, non-propositionalised questions about how their world is and how it is likely to
continue to be as part of the anticipatory affective dynamics of their living, breathing experience. Thus they
are, in their affectively-laden, intentionally-saturated activity, feeling their way, whatever synaesthetic mix
of modalities they might, from moment to moment, employ. At this point I will present a number of theories
of embodiment, their advantages and limitations, which I will follow up by elaborating a notion of extended
enkinaesthetic embodiment. This, I argue, will offer us a new wave of embodiment theory, and one which
has at its heart the radical and reciprocal extension of sensorimotor affect into the life and being of other
agents where their experience is for us both direct and immediate, as ours is for them; it is, therefore, a claim
for an immanent intercorporeality.
The personal and the enkinaesthetic private
In “Neurophenomenology: A methodological remedy for the hard problem” Varela claims that
Experience is clearly a personal event, but that does not mean it is private, in the sense of some
kind of isolated subject that is parachuted down onto a pre-given objective world. [Varela 1996,
p.340]
In the context of this quotation Varela has been extolling the many virtues of the phenomenological method
and, in particular, the phenomenological reduction, as a response to the irreducible nature of conscious
experience and the “pragmatic and methodological limbo” [ibid. p.334] that such an epistemic irreducibility
entails [Searle 1992]. Key to a phenomenological approach, and a remedy to this apparent irreducibility, is
“the re-discovery of the primacy of human experience and its direct, lived quality” [Varela 1996, p.335]. For
this rediscovery we must “turn the direction of the movement of thinking from its habitual content-oriented
direction backwards towards the arising of thoughts themselves” [ibid. p.337], and this we must do through
the practice of living, experiential reflexivity.
With such a careful practice of reflection we can begin to dispense with the “habitual fog separating experi-
encer and world” [ibid.], and in its place gain an immediacy, that is, an intimacy with the other, both agential
(human beings, cats, horses, worms) and non-agential (coffee pots, pencil cases, vases). This practice doesn’t
just ground us in our embodiment with our world as a condition of our experience, it also discloses the in-
timacy with which we come to situate the personal in our experience and the immediacy with which we
experience the other in what we, and they, habitually, and thus most usually, take to be the private.
Few people would question the personal nature of first-person experience, though many are willing to ques-
tion the reliability of first-person introspective reports,4 and there are even more who are willing to mull over
3I have elsewhere, for example, Stuart 2010 & Stuart 2012, used the categories of ‘agential’ and ‘non-agential’, but given Latour’s
arguments for the action or participation of non-humans (‘actants’) within rhizomic-networks (see, for example, Latour 2005), I am
content to construe the former as intentional, the latter as non-intentional, and both as significant, contributing to the co-articulation of
meaning, within a dynamic material-semiotic.
4See, most notably and interestingly, Schwitzgebel 2007, 2008 & 2011 for arguments against reliability, and Gertler 2001 & 2010
for arguments in favour of reliability.
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the issue of immunity to error through misidentification.5 I certainly do not question the personal first-person
nature of experience, but I do question its privacy, and here’s why.
Experience doesn’t start with language, it starts with dynamic plenisentient enquiry and action within the
affective community and reciprocity of other plenisentient living organisms and things. Thomas Reid was
aware of this when he wrote that mankind’s invention of an artificial language, as an expression of our
conceptualisation of our linguistic relation to our world, first necessitates the possession of a natural non-
propositional, preconceptual language. [Reid 1769, 1983] The expression of natural language requires no
intervention of concepts and no exercise of cognitive conceptualisation such that I need to reason from what
I see to what I should think.6 Instead Reidian natural language carries with it sensation, so immanent in my
experience, so pre-reflexive and spontaneous in my living being, that I am able to anticipate immediately in
the nature of a countenance, in the nature of a body, the intentionality of its bearer, preparing me for a range
(or horizon) of future possibilities. As Reid says:
An infant may be put into a fright by an angry countenance, and soothed again by smiles and
blandishments. A child that has a good musical ear, may be put to sleep or to dance, may be
made merry or sorrowful, by the modulation of musical sounds. [Reid 1983, p.43]
And, of course, it isn’t just infants. Our plenisentient enquiry, our exercise of our natural language, operates
within an enkinaesthetic field, where by ‘field’ is meant the domain within which a particular condition
prevails, and by “enkinaesthetic field” is meant the community and reciprocity of the intentionally-saturated
felt cadences of living experience, all of which are regulated by the fluctuating prosodies of affection and
resonance, rejection, kindness, indifference and fragmentation.7 Through the enquiry and action of natural
languaging the infant makes sense of its world, reaching, touching, grasping, and feeling resistance, feeling
yielding, tasting bitterness and tasting sweetness, creating patterns of concern, of meaning, and patterns of
somatosensory emotionally-laden anticipation for how something has been and how it is likely to continue
to be.
And, so, experience doesn’t start with concepts, it starts with pre-reflective, pre-conceptual sensory enquiry
and action; it starts with meaning-making within an open dynamic system, and it begins pre-natally as early
as eleven weeks:
Human foetuses tentatively touch the placenta, umbilicus and the uterine wall with their hands
at 11 weeks. They make jaw movements and swallow amniotic fluid, expressing pleasure or
disapproval at tastes injected into it by sucking and smiling or grimacing with disgust. Complex
movements of trunk, arms and legs position the body, and may react to the mother’s body
movements and the contractions of the muscles of her uterus (Lecanuet, et al., 1995; Piontelli,
2002; Trevarthen, et al., 2006). (Trevarthen and Reddy, 2007)
5See, amongst a great many examples, Wittgenstein 1958, Shoemaker 1970, Perry 1973, and Evans 1982. I doubt that there are
many, if any, non-pathological examples of such an error. Obvious pathological cases include Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID)
[see Stirn, Thiel & Oddo (2009)], and the extraordinary experience, documented by Alphonse Daudet who, suffering from a form of
tertiary syphilis, tabes dorsalis, remarked that “Sometimes I feel as if I don’t own part of myself – the lower half. My legs get confused.”
[Daudet 2002, p.41]
6Even though we are distinguished from ‘the brutes’ by our need for the invention of an artificial language, “[T]he brutes have some
natural signs by which they express their own thoughts, affections, and desires, and understand those of others.”[Reid 1983, Chp. 4,
Sect. II, p.32].
7The Still Face experiment [Tronick, Adamson, Als & Brazelton 1975; Tronick 2007; Tronick & Beeghly 2011] offers an excellent
example of the kind of affective community and reciprocity described by Reid, except that we now know that being soothed after
being fearful doesn’t work to simply reset the infant’s system to its pre-experimental ‘settings’; in fact, Tronick and colleagues have
discovered that a four month old infant, who has experienced disengagement and neglect within the Still Face experiment, will have a
two week memory of it, producing the same negative responses – the production of the stress hormone cortisol and an increase in heart
rate – when anticipating the same kind of experience. [See, for example, Grant, McMahon, Austin, Reilly, Leader, & Ali, S. (2009).]
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Throughout its development the foetus, bursting into life, folds into its world as it unfolds in its enkinaes-
thetically abundant enquiry and action. Post-natally, with the development of the visual sense, the infant
becomes quickly aware of the reciprocal gaze, even of the intersubjective scrutiny8, and enkinaesthetically
of the felt trespass of the other. Given the recognition of this affectively complex dynamic agency, we can
only conclude that there can be no being which is not also an enkinaesthetically enfolded being-with9 other
open enkinaesthetic systems. In this way, somatosensory enquiry and action requires not just a plenisentient
body but a whole world of plenisentient bodies and other bodies too, and so it is that “[w]henever I try to
understand myself, the whole fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it comes the others who
are caught in it.” [Merleau-Ponty 1964, p.15].
And, thus, experience certainly doesn’t start with privacy. We reach, we touch, we taste, we hear the world
around us, spilling over into it, being resisted, touched, tasted and heard ourselves. It isn’t just that our
affective sensorimotor enquiry and action overlaps and interweaves with the affective sensorimotor enquiry
and action of the other, it is that, as meaning-making activities they co-constitute one another. But it isn’t
within some merely functional sense that they co-constitute one another; they are co-constituting in an
experiential affective sense, where the other is “always “already there” [in my experience] before reflection
begins” [Merleau-Ponty 1970, p.65]. So, now when I try to understand myself as a possibility of being
amidst the whole,
. . . the whole fabric of the perceptible world comes too, and with it comes the others who are
caught in it. . . . For [others] are not fictions with which I might people my desert–offspring of
my spirit and forever unactualized possibilities–but my twins or the flesh of my flesh. [Merleau-
Ponty 1964, p.15]
The others in my experience, my twins, the flesh of my flesh, exist for me within the enkinaesthetic field
of my somatosensory affective enquiry and action, and I within theirs, we each with the ability to feel the
givenness and ownership of our own experience, as simultaneously experientially entwined with the living
feeling breathing dynamical being of all other living beings and things.10 So, if we are to reach the point
where we are able to speak of solitary individuated beings, it must be as some conceptual derivative of our
primary mode of plenisentient enkinaesthetic being, and then as an abstract conceptualisation of ourselves
as cognitively contained and cognitively sustainable; as minds in communication with minds, bodies as
useful but unnecessary, occasionally even a burden getting in the way of the rational and methodical mind.
So, let’s establish our main conclusion from this section, that a central characteristic of ‘enkinaesthesia’ is
the experiential immanence – the direct, non-duality of the inescapable experience of the plenisentient and
enkinaesthetic ‘other’, and then we can proceed to the theories of embodiment, from minimal to radical, and
beyond with the extended embodiment theory of immanent enkinaesthetic intercoproreality.
8I do not mean to imply any notion of critical judgement by the use of the term ‘scrutiny’; I mean only an intent curiosity or interest
in the other’s activity. A good example would be a crow perceiving the progress of a cat through a garden and out through a gate. The
crow has no concept of cat, garden or gate, but its experience is intentionally-saturated and affectively-laden. It is plenisentially aware
of its world, of the breeze, the proximity, rate and direction of movement of the cat, the rustling of dry leaves and where they gather,
the changing expanse of shadows and light, and so on, and all of these exist as concernful matterings for the crow.
9Elsewhere I refer to this as the Mitseinwelt [see, for example, Stuart 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, & 2015, & Stuart & Thibault 2015],
and which Roche is now describing as eˆtre avec [Roche 2015, personal correspondence].
10We already find this notion of community and reciprocity in the A edition version of Kant’s third Analogy where he states that
“All substances, so far as they coexist, stand in thoroughgoing community that is, in mutual interaction.” [A212]; but Kant was shy of
ontological commitments and mentions neither embodiment nor emotion, so we must relegate Kant’s, still extraordinary, insight to this
footnote.
4
Embodiment Theories
Rorty claims that “If the body had been easier to understand, nobody would have thought that we have a
mind.” [Rorty 1980, p.239], and in “Six views of embodied cognition” Wilson (2002) describes the “growing
commitment to the idea that the mind must be understood in the context of its relationship to a physical body
that interacts with the world” [p.625]. Wilson states very tentatively, for these are relatively early days in the
resurgence of embodiment theory,11 that
It is argued that we have evolved from creatures whose neural resources were devoted primarily
to perceptual and motoric processing, and whose cognitive activity consisted largely of im-
mediate, on-line interaction with the environment. Hence human cognition, rather than being
centralized, abstract, and sharply distinct from peripheral input and output modules, may instead
have deep roots in sensorimotor processing. [ibid.]
In the “Interpretations of embodied cognition” Gallagher (2011) maps “out the landscape of . . . various
senses of embodied cognition”. It is a surprisingly varied and shifting terrain, and Gallagher establishes
within it five distinctive (currently) commonly accepted forms: Minimal embodiment, exemplified by the
work of Goldman & De Vignemont, particularly “Is social cognition embodied?” (2009); Functional em-
bodiment (Clark 1999, 2008a & 2008b; Wheeler 2005), introducing the extended mind hypothesis (Clark
1997; Clark & Chalmers 1998), the point of which is to reduce computational load; Biological (Shapiro
2004 & 2007); Semantic (Lakoff & Johnston 1999); and Radical / Enactive. I will present the essential
elements of these theories very briefly, and then concentrate on two, one requiring a negligible embodiment,
if an embodiment at all, for the occurrence of successful cognitive functioning, and the other requiring a
fully situated embodiment. Naturally, I am inclined towards an acceptance of the latter, but I will outline its
limitations and how these can be addressed by a fleshed-out12 enkinaesthetic theory.
Summary of embodiment theories
Of the five senses of embodied cognition (EC), minimal embodiment is actually a classical cognitivist (CC)
model, where the body is present but without its brain, and even without its environment, and the other four
are varieties of embodied cognition which offer no such crude amputation of world or disjunction of brain
and body. Mental representations, mental objects with semantic properties, are necessary for minimal and
functional embodiment theories, and unnecessary for radical / enactive theory; biological and semantic forms
of embodiment theory are committed to weak forms of representation. Minimal, functional, and semantic
embodiment theories are concerned with social and higher-level cognitive functioning, functional embodi-
ment theory is also concerned with perception and action; biological embodiment theory is concerned with
perception and action; and radical / enactive theory is concerned with perception and action, and with social
cognition. From this brief summary it can be concluded that minimal and functional forms of embodiment
are consistent with classical cognitivism, that radical / enactive theory is definitely not, and that biological
and semantic theories are neutral in this regard. Enkinaesthetic theory is non-representational; it is concerned
with perception and action, and with social cognition; and it is not consistent with classical cognitivism.
Minimal Embodiment
The most extreme form of minimal embodiment is presented by Goldman & de Vignemont (2009) who,
with much good humour, introduce us to their concerns about the ‘spectre’ of embodied cognition which is
11Before behaviourism and computationalism the body played a crucial role in the work of the American pragmatists, James (1900)
and Dewey (1925), and in the work of, for example, Feuerbach (1843/1972) and Nietzsche (1883–91/1961).
12Merleau-Ponty pun intended.
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distracting theorists from reputable, that is, classical, theories of the mind and the mental. They offer their
own notion of embodiment, which pretty much leaves the body behind, and is so unlike what one would
expect of a theory of embodied cognition, that it is hard to take them quite seriously.
A spectre is haunting the laboratories of cognitive science, the spectre of embodied cognition
(EC). For decades, the reigning paradigm of cognitive science has been classicism. On this ap-
proach, higher cognitive functions are analogized to the operations of a computer, manipulating
abstract symbols on the basis of specific computations. As embodiment theorists tell the story,
classical cognitivism (CC) claims that mental operations are largely detached from the work-
ings of the body, the body being merely an output device for commands generated by abstract
symbols in the mind (or the ‘central system’ of the mind). Embodiment theorists want to elevate
the importance of the body in explaining cognitive activities. What is meant by ‘body’ here? It
ought to mean: the whole physical body minus the brain. Letting the brain qualify as part of the
body would trivialize the claim that the body is crucial to mental life, simply because the brain
is the seat of most, if not all, mental events. [Goldman & de Vignemont 2009, p.154]
This limited, and limiting, gesture to the inclusion of a brainless body as essential for experience and cog-
nition, is extraordinary in its criticism of embodiment theorists for their characterisation of classical cogni-
tivism as claiming that “mental operations are largely detached from the workings of the body”, for this is
precisely what Goldman & de Vignemont propose in their article. There is a similar sort of hand-waving
towards the effects that sensorimotor contingencies have on perceptual experience, for example, although
they accept that opening and closing one’s eyes can affect what one sees, they deem these contingencies to
be too trivial to be of any consequence for cognitive processes; so, they might supply data, but they have no
role in the processes themselves. This they also claim to be true for “body-related traits”, including body
postures and other non-representational bodily activity. In truth the claim to even a minimally embodied sys-
tem seems tenuous, for whatever it is, their body is neither cognitively coupled nor environmentally situated.
Instead they are committed to the claim that “mental representations with bodily contents have an important
causal role in cognition” [ibid. p.155], where bodily representations, ‘B-reps’, are a class of mental repre-
sentation, and are distinguished into ‘B-contents’ and ‘B-formats’; B-reps are then classified as bodily in
virtue of their being encoded in B-formats. So, now we need to know, with some precision, what a B-format
is because, if B-reps are mental representations that just happen to be about the body, they are cognitive and,
presumably, non-physical, and yet, they are classified as bodily because they are rendered in a particular
format, and being in this format gives them “an important causal role in cognition” [ibid.].
But, for all their over-complication of the issue, there is a certain clarity about B-formats, and, simultaneously
there is no great mystery either for they have ‘tamed’ embodiment to such an extent that only ‘sanitized’13
mentally represented B-reps remain and the B-format of these representations, since they are mental, has got
to be in the brain in brain states and neural processes. Body formats are neuronal representations of bodily
activity. The evidence for this claim is present in the form of appeals to the role of mirror neurons in our
capacity to imitate, especially in the context of social cognition, and to imagine.
B-formats can be exploited for social purposes either during perception or during imagination
of another individual in a specific state. The former corresponds to what is called ‘mirroring’
. . . The discovery of mirror neurons opened a wide window on the possibility that some social
cognition starts at a primitive level of motor planning. [Gallese, Keysers & Rizzolatti 2004] The
prelude to the discovery was finding a neural vocabulary in monkey premotor cortex in which
types of actions (e.g. grasping, holding and tearing) are coded by populations of neurons. [ibid.
p.156].
13‘Tame’ and ‘sanitized’ are both words used by Goldman & de Vignemont to describe the charge that might be made “with some
justice” against their minimalist theory.
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So now, it would seem, all that Goldman & de Vignemont say about the body is consistent with its being
a dry husk, and their brain, as the seat of all mental events, could exist in some sanitised vat. Theirs is a
representation-heavy theory of dis-embodied cognition, and their claim that “Letting the brain qualify as
part of the body would trivialize the claim that the body is crucial to mental life” is seriously misleading
for the reader, at least initially. The body is crucial to mental life for Goldman & de Vignemont only
because it is neural, and the neural, in a move entirely consistent with classical computational cognitivist
approaches, can exist without being embodied. But neural signals, the simple electrochemical impulses sent
along nerve pathways, cannot do everything. Goldman & de Vignemont ignore, for example, the humoral
signals, chemical messages that are sent by the bloodstream [Meijsing 2006], and they also fail to grasp that
Any vat capable of performing the necessary functions will have to be a surrogate body that both
regulates and is regulated by the nervous system. In other words, the vat will have to exhibit
a level of complexity at least as high as that of a living body with respect to bodily systems of
life-regulation and sensorimotor coupling. Thus the entire system (vat plus brain) must satisfy
these two basic requirements: (i) it must be energetically open and able to actively regulate the
flow of matter and energy through it so as to control its own external boundary conditions (life-
regulation); and (ii) it must be capable of actively regulating its own sensorimotor interactions
with the outside world (sensorimotor agency). In short, the entire system must amount to a
biologically autonomous, sensorimotor agent. [Cosmelli & Thompson 2011, pp.28–9].
So, although Goldman & de Vignemont prefer their claims to be “scientifically and philosophically fruitful”,
and they urge us to “recognize that selected cognitive tasks might be executed via embodied processes”
[Goldman & de Vignemont 2009, p.154], they do not wish us to get ahead of ourselves and actually assert
– even for excellent scientific, pragmatic, phenomenological, and philosophical reasons – the more ‘global’
claim that there really is a body, let alone a biologically autonomous, sensorimotor agent. It is to this we will
now turn with the enactive account of embodiment.
Enactive / Radical Embodiment
In stark contrast to minimal embodiment, enactive / radical embodiment argues for dynamic, non-symbolic,
non-representational distribution of cognitive processes across brain, body and environment. It is essentially
anti-dualistic, but unlike classical cognitivism’s inclination towards a monist materialism, the ontological
commitments made by the enactivist are rather more complicated. This is largely because of the active
processual and relational nature of the extended agential-environment whole, but it’s also down to the fact
that enactive theorists accept neither individual nor interaction as primary, rather attempting to understand
“the mutually enabling relations between the two levels” [Di Paolo & Thompson 2014, p.75].
So, the agent is embodied and dynamically-coupled to the world of other agents and things, such that the
“biological aspects of bodily life, including organismic and emotion regulation of the entire body, have a per-
meating effect on cognition, as do processes of sensori-motor coupling between organism and environment”
[Gallagher 2011, p.66]. In this way agent, world and action are so intricately interwoven in their bringing
forth a world for the agent, that it would be ludicrous to think of pulling them apart and still having a coher-
ent system in the way Goldman & de Vignemont recommend. Thus, under the radical enactive conception
mind and world are inseparable, and it is embodied affective practice, rather than cognitive deliberation and
computation, that is the hallmark of the agent’s engagement with its world.
In Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind, Evan Thompson characterises enactive
embodiment in the following five-point way:
[F]irst . . . living beings are autonomous agents that actively generate and maintain themselves,
and thereby also enact or bring forth their own cognitive domains. . . . [S]econd . . . the nervous
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system is an autonomous dynamic system . . . [T]hird . . . cognition is the exercise of skillful
know-how in situated and embodied action. . . . [F]ourth . . . a cognitive being’s world is not a
prespecified, external realm, represented internally by its brain, but a relational domain enacted
or brought forth by that being’s autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment.
. . . [F]ifth . . . experience is not an epiphenomenal side issue, but central to any understanding of
the mind, and needs to be investigated in a careful phenomenological manner. [Thompson 2007,
p.13]14
In addition, and in an earlier piece of writing, Thompson emphasises the crucial role of self-other co-
determination, stating that “embodied cognition emerges from the dynamic co-determination of self and
other” [Thompson 2001, p.4]. In this he is referring to the “core dyad” which takes experiential develop-
ment to operate intercorporeally from the beginning, and he quotes Gallagher & Meltzoff [1996] as saying
that “The body schema, working systematically with proprioceptive awareness, operates as a proprioceptive
self that is always already ‘coupled’ with the other ” [pp. 225–6]. Thompson thus states that
the affective mind isn’t in the head, but in the whole body; and affective states are emergent
in the reciprocal, co-determination sense: they arise from neural and somatic activity that itself
is conditioned by the ongoing embodied awareness and action of the whole animal or person
. . . [and going] one step further . . . much of affect is a prototypical two-organism event, by which
I mean a prototypical self–other event. [Thompson 2001, p.4]
There’s a great deal to welcome with enactive / radical embodiment, not least of which is the significance
it attaches to the distribution of affect, and not just the distribution of cognition; and there is also the way
in which it accentuates the role played by the embodied and situated nervous system in creating meaning in
the interplay of its perception, action and world; this dynamic affective interplay is the basis for meaning-
making, it is semiogenetic, grounding meaning in the agent’s values-realising activity15; and there is also
the emphasis it places on the dyadically-coupled nature of conscious human experience. Together these
great virtues lead us to a way in which we can speak meaningfully about the agent in the everydayness
of its pragmatic activity, where it is situated and embodied and we have no need to invoke neural repre-
sentations, symbols or computational approaches. Yet enactive embodiment theory also has limitations; its
claims for autonomy and operational closure can seem inconsistent with its claims for cognitive distribution,
though not with its claims for and distributed affect, and its radicality claim is exaggerated, possibly even a
misrepresentation when its focus is firmly on the individual system. We’ll address these in the next section.
By now it should be apparent that whilst enkinaesthetic theory is utterly inconsistent with classical com-
putational cognitivist theories of embodiment, it has much more in common with the enactive theory of
embodiment. And, yet there are some crucial differences which identify enkinaesthesia as offering a more
thoroughgoing and truly radical theory of embodiment, one which involves an immanent enkinaesthetic in-
tercorporeality, which includes other agents16 and other non-agential things in, what one might call, our
living, breathing ‘interbeing’.17
14As Thompson notes these ideas were first presented in a unified form by Varela, Thompson & Rosch (1991).
15In this respect, see De Jaegher & Di Paolo (2007) on participatory sense-making, and Hodges (2007) on values-realisation, meaning
and affordance.
16Plants also count as agential because enkinaesthesia starts with life and living and not with what we think of as acting in ‘real-
time’, whatever that may be. It is true that in this paper I am emphasising the neuro-muscular dynamical flows and muscle tensions of
particular sorts of agents, the sort which have soft tissue and muscles, but plants also adapt to the contingency and predator, co-creating
their environment through the evolution of defence mechanisms like thorns and toxins, and attractors like colours and scents. The
Darlingtonia californica or Cobra Lily presents a wonderful example of this.
17Varela offers some “steps towards a science of interbeing” [Varela 1999] and enkinaesthetic theory is now an ideal candidate for
the thoughtful and provocative development of these steps.
Stage 4 is generative cognitive science, where the neurophenomenological perspective is extended to include as foun-
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Our focus in the following section will be on autonomy and radicality, and the shortcomings of enactivism
as a radical form of embodiment theory, and then on outlining enkinaesthetic interbeing as a means to
redress these shortcomings, and put in their place a much more progressive and thoroughgoing immanent
enkinaesthetic intercorporeality.
Autonomy & Radicality
The enactive approach does not start from the question of whether cognitive processes extend
beyond one or another boundary, such as the skin, skull, or central nervous system, that is
supposed to mark some inside/outside distinction. Rather, the enactive approach starts from
the question of how a system must be organized in order to be an autonomous system–one
that generates and sustains its own activity and thereby enacts or brings forth its own cognitive
domain. [Thompson & Stapleton 2009, p.23-4]
The authors continue, saying that the focus for the enactivist is on the enabling conditions for cognition,
where ‘cognition’ is defined as “the relational process of sense-making that takes place between the system
and its environment” [ibid., p.26], and where “cognition belongs to the ‘relational domain’ in which the
system as a unity relates to the wider context of its milieu” [ibid.].
Thus, the system, organism, or agent, exists within its milieu18, with the milieu operating on the system
and the system operating on its milieu, in such a way that the system, as a unity, generates and sustains its
own activity. These operations are cognitive, because they are sense-making, in the pre-conceptual sense
of values-realising, and they occur within the ‘relational domain’, where the concept, ‘relational domain’,
remains ambiguous. An autonomous system is, therefore, “a thermodynamically open system with opera-
tional closure that actively generates and sustains its identity under precarious conditions” [ibid., p.24]. One
suspects from this that, in the case of the core dyad, the intersubjective other exists to support the unity and
autonomy of the system, and vice versa, and it seems most likely that this is what is meant by “self-other
co-determination”.
So, let’s draw out the notion of a ‘between’ – one imagines as a somewhere, a some time, though most
probably a pragmatic somehow – in which the organism and its environment act together to generate meaning
for the organism. It’s a claim which prises apart the system and its environment, and drives a claim for
operational closure and the autonomy of the individual (whether ant, crocodile, paramecium, or human). The
‘between’ is a notion which seems to have been derived by little more than the observation of a perceptual
split that creates the illusion of “the body here detecting the surrounding environment out there” [Gendlin
2012, p.144], and it’s an illusion which continues to encourage the dissociation, and even separation, of
organism, “the system as unity”, and environment. It is in this ‘between’, the pragmatic somehow, that the
enactivist posits the distribution of cognitive action (and sensorimotor enquiry). What remains is a false
dichotomy which conveniently fits many of our existing conceptual and cultural narratives, and is even one
that Merleau-Ponty falls prey to when he speaks of the chiasm:
There is a circle of the touched and the touching, the touched takes hold of the touching; there
is a circle of the visible and the seeing, the seeing is not without visible existence; there is even
dational its intersubjective, empathic–affective dimension. At this stage, cognitive science begins to touch on the sphere
of interbeing . . .
Stage 5 is neurophenomenology – a further extension of the embodied-emergent perspective [Varela 1999, pp.86–7]
Stuart [2013] presents an experimental framework for a neurophenomenological study of the intersubjective, affectively-laden enki-
naesthetic union of nervous systems and experiential systems within the practice of the Alexander Technique.
18The choice of ‘milieu’ instead of ‘environment’ is interesting because ‘milieu’ carries with it the joint notions of internal and
external milieux, and even the notion of thermodynamic openness, unfortunately in the quotation above ‘milieu’ seems only to be used
in the external environment sense. For the internal milieu, the homeostatic regulatory system, see Bernard 1974.
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an inscription of the touching in the visible, of the seeing in the tangible – and the converse;
there is finally a propagation of these exchanges to all the bodies of the same type and of the
same style which I see and touch – and this by virtue of the fundamental fission or segregation
of the sentient and the sensible which, laterally, makes the organs of my body communicate and
founds transitivity from one body to another. [Merleau-Ponty 1968, p.143]
In these sensory intertwinings Merleau-Ponty is indicating something profound about experience19; he is
indicating its “ambiguous transcendence” [Young 1980], that is, the experiential inseparability of our being,
which is at one and the same time, both subject and object, and in being both subject and object we cannot
be either individually. In fact, at a pre-noetic plenisentient pragmatic level, it makes no sense whatsoever
to talk of subjects and objects. And, yet, Merleau-Ponty pulls them apart, distinguishing “the fundamental
fission or segregation of the sentient and the sensible”, drawing out a perceptual distinction which fits and
supports the ongoing conceptual narrative that requires intentional transitivity for its experience, rather than
intentionally-saturated experience.20 In doing so he disregards the primordial nature of experience as a
prenoetically universal aspect of non-individuated being; which is, in turn, to disregard the primordial nature
of experience as the ‘between’, the process, the enkinaesthetic pragmatic somehow which brings with it the
whole fabric of the perceptible world as one and the same ‘flesh’21. In this way, enkinaesthesia prioritises
the relational within the cognitive-affective enkinaesthetic field, and rejects the enactivist’s notion of local
operational closure, no matter how precarious it might be, as both a semantic and ontological category
mistake.
The ontological category mistake is the result of a move from the perceptual to the conceptual, bringing with
it an additional ontological duality, the system and its environment on the one hand, and the relational on the
other; and it is a semantic category mistake because the notion of local operational closure and the autonomy
of the system yields a convenient fiction that the agent is an operationally distinct unity, a theory useful only
in our social narratives where we need to, in the case of human beings, differentiate between persons for
reasons of taxes, exam results, moral culpability, immunisation histories, and family trees.22 The enactivist
might yet be unperturbed, after all, theirs is a theory about the individuated system, but if that is the case,
their claims for a really radical form of embodiment are very much exaggerated.
Enkinaesthesia and Immanent Intercoporeality
Let’s take stock. The enactivist emphasises the importance of affect and emotion, and how affective and
emotional states emerge from the interplay of organism or system and world. They propose the distribution
of affect within the body, but that is where it remains as a comparatively localised phenomenon. Affective
and emotional states play a crucial role in the generation of meaning through the cognitive sensorimotor
engagement of the organism with its world, where world can include other conscious organisms whose role
is as one half of a core dyad without whom intersubjective experience and self-consciousness could not
emerge. Although organism and world are so closely aligned as to be co-constituting, they retain their au-
tonomy through the precarious condition of their operational closure, and cognition occurs in the ‘relational
domain’ between the system as a unity and the wider context of its milieu. The enactivist claim for radical
embodiment is limited by their individuating claims for autonomy and operational closure, and also by their
individuated notion of distributed affect, even when accepting co-determination of meaning.
19Note that I do not refer to human experience, or animal experience, or any individuating experience, but to experience itself.
20It would be too much of a side step to go into this issue in greater detail in the body of this paper, suffice, for now, to say
that intentional transitivity requires an experiencing subject and an object or objects to which their attention is directed, whereas
intentionally-saturated experience is characterised by ambiguous transcendence without a need for additional transitivity.
21Here I use Merleau-Ponty’s word ‘flesh’ [1964, p.15], but, it should be clear that this is not his thought.
22This is not a complete list.
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What is now needed is an explanatory system which doesn’t multiply its problems beyond necessity, and
in this case, we need something which doesn’t recreate a dichotomising metaphysics of subject and object,
with something extra, a cognitive process, in between. In this respect we need a theory which doesn’t make
a virtue out of individuation, and for that we need a theory which doesn’t fall prey to the narrative attraction
of shifting from an apparent perceptual distinction to the conceptual reification of that distinction (even with
its thermodynamic permeability). If we can meet these conditions, we will have a thoroughly radical theory
of embodiment. I propose enkinaesthetic theory for just this purpose.
If we return for a moment to the “habitual fog separating experiencer and world” [Varela 1996, p.337], we
can now understand that one way of reading this phrase is to assume the dichotomy of experiencer and world,
and then approach the task of clearing the fog as one which requires a close examination of the cognitive
relational domain which draws experiencer and world together at the cost of pulling them apart. This is an
approach adopted by enactivism, but we have seen that this approach is flawed for the reasons already given.
But there is another approach and one, I contend, more closely aligned with the development of Varela’s
proposed science of interbeing.
Perhaps Varela intended his phrase to be read as indicating how the fog obscures and misleads the viewer
into falsely identifying visible peaks as distinct, and so on, but if we adopt the enkinaesthetic theory with
its ambiguous transcendence, there is nothing for the fog to coalesce around, and nothing to be falsely
identified. With the dispersal of the fog we find a non-individuating affectively-laden enkinaesthetic field
in which the whole fabric of the perceptible affective world comes too. Within this experientially entangled
enkinaesthetic field the other’s affectively-laden being is immanent in my being as an always already there.
We might describe this by saying that our lived experience is always tempered by the direct spontaneous
reception, or passive synthesis, of the experientially entangled living being of the other as they transgress
our own experience and we theirs, but the point to note is this: this intentional transgression is immediate,
non-inferential co-being, characterised by a pre-noetic immanent enkinaesthetic intercorporeality.
This is offered as a new wave of embodiment theory because it has at its core the radical extension of
sensorimotor affect into the life and being of other agents, whether other humans, animals, plants, and even,
for it is not implausible, other non-agential things.23 To end this section let me offer an example of this
radical extension of sensorimotor affect in a quotation from Steinbeck’s short story The Chysanthemums.
The protagonist Elisa has the following exchange with a travelling saleman:
”Did you ever hear of planting hands?”
”Can’t say I have, ma am.
”Well, I can only tell you what it feels like. It’s when you’re picking off the buds you don’t
want. Everything goes right down into your fingertips. You watch your fingers work. They do
it themselves. You can feel how it is. They pick and pick the buds. They never make a mistake.
They’re with the plant. Do you see? Your fingers and the plant. You can feel that, right up your
arm. They know. They never make a mistake. You can feel it. When you’re like that you can’t
do anything wrong. Do you see that? Can you understand that?”
Elisa understands her interbeing, the immanence of the living corporeality of the other in her experience,
and she grasps her world feelingly, her fingers opening up possibilities of being, not facts about the world.24
23I do not wish to rule out the extension of our sensorimotor affect into the non-agential, for example, the things we value in our lives
like a car or a sculpture, but it cannot be the subject of this current paper.
24This is a paraphrasing of Ricoeur 1981, p. 56.
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Conclusion
Everything offered within enkinaesthetic theory is perfectly consistent with the claim that we are, at one
and the same time, prenoetically a universal non-individuated being, and perceptually and noetically indi-
viduated. But when we talk in this way we must understand and be very clear that the first refers to the
primordial nature of experience, and the second is derived and artificial, an expression of our cultural rela-
tion to our world. Reid understood this with his distinction between natural and artificial languages. Some
theories of embodiment conflate the artificial and the natural, and some theories speak only of the artificial,
ignoring the natural. Neither succeeds. I have rejected both and proposed an alternative characterised by
the radical extension of sensorimotor affect into the life and being of other agents where their experience is
for us both direct and immediate. This immanent enkinaesthetic intercorporeality defines my being through
my interbeing, and my corporeality through my intercorporeality with you and the intercorporeality of all
things.
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